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Almost twenty years ago, in a case involving the use of black arm-
bands by high-school and junior-high-school students to express their op-
position to the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court stated: "It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' Since that
statement in 1969, almost every court facing a question of student press
rights has started its analysis with the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District decision and found student journalism en-
titled to extensive first amendment protection.
Many courts, in granting such protections to the student press, have
based their analysis on the "public forum doctrine. ' 2 The Supreme
Court developed this doctrine to ensure that once the state established a
"forum" for public discourse or expression, it would not censor speech or
speakers absent highly compelling circumstances.3 As such, the doctrine
has had a logical application to school-sponsored student newspapers,
which provide avenues for the expression of student news and view-
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I. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2. See, eg., Stanton v. Brunswick School Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560, 1570-71 (D. Me. 1984);
Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 564
F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1977); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 37 A.D.2d 987, 988, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757
(1971), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 296 N.E.2d 238, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1973). Other courts have applied
a forum analysis without specifically referring to it as such. See, eg., Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d
257, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1975); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1973); Bazaar v.
Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 575-80, aff'd as modified en banc per curiam, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Kom v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (D. Md. 1970); Zucker
v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F.
Supp. 613, 617-18 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot sub nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d
515 (5th Cir. 1968).
3. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
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points. Thus, recognizing that school authorities' suppression of content
essentially denies access to the pages of a student newspaper, courts have
relied on the analysis also applied to public auditoriums4 and public uni-
versity facilities.5
On January 13, 1988, however, the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 6 which sharply lim-
ited the rights of students operating newspapers as part of a public school
curriculum. As we will discuss below, 7 Kuhlmeier eviscerates the
Supreme Court's decision in Tinker, overrules many lower-court deci-
sions protective of the student press, and curtails student press rights
established for well over a generation. The decision is also notable, how-
ever, for what it does not say, and because of that, some avenues for free
expression by high-school students remain. Although Kuhlmeier dealt
with a school-sponsored newspaper, it also casts uncertainty upon the
status of independently run student newspapers and student newspapers
at the college level. We will argue that the Kuhlmeier decision affects
neither of these types of newspapers. The first amendment protections
afforded these newspapers retain the vitality derived from the history of
student press litigation in the past twenty years.
I. STUDENT PRESS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS, 1969-1988
Nearly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court first explicitly recog-
nized that public school students enjoy first amendment protections. 8
The decision in Tinker involved symbolic expression in a high school and
a junior high school, but the Supreme Court and other courts subse-
quently applied Tinker's principles to cases involving the student press at
the high-school and college levels.9
In contexts other than the student press, the Court uses a "forum"
analysis to determine when the government's interest in restricting use of
its property or facilities to an intended purpose outweighs the interest of
those wishing to use the property or facilities for other purposes.10 The
Court has stated that "a public forum may be created by government
designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public
at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the
4. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
5. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
6. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
7. See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9. See, e-g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (college); Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (high school); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F.
Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.) (high school), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
10. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
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discussion of certain subjects."' 1 Once a state establishes a "public fo-
rum," it can restrict the expression that occurs there only when it can
demonstrate a compelling state interest and when the restriction is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest.' 2 Thus, for example, if a city were
to allow plays, speeches, or meetings at a civic auditorium, that audito-
rium would be a public forum, and the city would violate the Constitu-
tion if it denied the auditorium's use for the performance of a play only
because the play offended city officials.' 3 Courts also recognize school
auditoriums, airports, and city parks as public forums, and have pro-
tected the right of such groups as the Hare Krishnas or the Nazi party to
engage in expressive activities in those forums free of government
censorship. 14
Further, the Supreme Court has consistently and unambiguously
stated that prior .restraints on expression are among the acts most disfa-
vored under the Constitution.'5 This disfavor has been, presumptively,
no less true in the context of our nation's public schools. 16
After Tinker, the Supreme Court handed down several decisions
dealing with the free speech rights of students. While all but one of these
cases involved college students, the rules announced seemed equally ap-
plicable in the high-school setting. In a 1972 case, Healy v. James, the
Court held that a college could not refuse to recognize a group merely
because the college disagreed with the group's philosophy or had an un-
documented fear of school disruption.' 7 In Papish v. Board of Cura-
tors, 18 decided a year later, a college expelled a student for distributing a
highly offensive newspaper on campus. The paper carried a political car-
toon, which depicted policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the
Goddess of Justice, and a headline announcing "Motherfucker Acquit-
ter." In concluding that the expulsion violated the student's first amend-
ment rights, the Court found that the newspaper was not "obscene" and
11. Id. at 802.
12. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
13. See id.
14. National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1015, 1019 (4th Cir.
1973) (school board may not prevent American Nazi Party from renting public school auditorium
absent real threat to property or good order); Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493, 501 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (Hare Krishnas may solicit charitable contributions in airport terminal buildings), modi-
fied, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982); Collin v. Smith, 447 F.
Supp. 676, 685-86 (N.D. Ill.) (city may not abridge Nazi group's right to assemble in city park by
requiring group to obtain insurance-unreasonable financial burden on exercise of its first amend-
ment rights), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
15. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
16. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17. 408 U.S. 169, 187-91 (1972).
18. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
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that it was not likely to cause a disruption of the school, and therefore
held that it could not be censored. 19 In a 1981 case, Widrmar v. Vincent,
the Supreme Court held that a state university's policy prohibiting the
use of otherwise generally available school facilities for religious teaching
or workshops violated students' rights to freedom of speech and
association. 20
Other courts also recognized the existence of public forums in
schools and curtailed school censorship of activities.21 These courts im-
plicitly recognized that the status of a student activity as curricular or
extracurricular, school-sponsored or student-sponsored, was irrelevant if
a forum existed. 22 One court stated that labeling an outlet for student
expression an "instructional tool" would not allow school administrators
unbridled control when a forum in fact existed.23 Another court stated
that the "state is not necessarily the unrestrained master of what it cre-
ates and fosters." 24 In addition, several courts specifically found that
when a school gave students an opportunity to speak publicly on issues
that concerned them, even though the speech occurred on school
grounds, for school credit, and involved the use of school funds and facil-
ities, the school had created a forum for student expression. 25
Courts have thus recognized that an official school newspaper is a
forum for student expression entitled to first amendment protection, as
long as the newspaper is something "more than a mere activity time and
19. Id. at 670.
20. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21. See, eg., Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va.) (recog-
nizing secondary-school publication as public forum and stating that material could not be sup-
pressed because it was objectionable to school board or its constituents), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d
157 (4th Cir. 1977); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Colo. 1971) (recognizing college
newspaper as forum for student expression and invalidating requirement that student staff obtain
faculty approval of any "controversial" material); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 104-05 (1969)
(recognizing high-school newspaper as forum for dissemination of ideas and holding that students
were entitled to publish advertisements paid for by students opposed to Vietnam War).
22. See, e.g., Zucker, 299 F. Supp. at 105 ("Defendants have [argued] that the [student newspa-
per] is not a newspaper in the usual sense, but is part of the curriculum and an educational de-
vice.... We have found, from review of its contents, that within the context of the school and
educational environment, it is a forum for the dissemination of ideas.").
23. Trujillo, 322 F. Supp. at 1268.
24. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970).
25. See Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 574, aff'd as modified en banc per curiam, 489 F.2d
225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F.
Supp. 1252, 1257 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 734; Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp.
1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without op., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Lee v. Board of Regents, 306
F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (W.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Zucker v. Panitz,
299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Stanton v. Brunswick School Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560,
1572 (D. Me. 1984) (finding substantial likelihood that yearbook used as vehicle for expression and
transmission of personally held views constituted public forum and could not be subjected to govern-
ment-sponsored censorship by vague, subjective, or nondiscrete standards).
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place sheet."' 26 Using this rationale, courts have upheld the rights of stu-
dent journalists to publish a four-letter reference to a university presi-
dent;27 a photograph of a burning American flag;28 an editorial calling
for continued racial segregation of a university;29 advertisements con-
cerning race relations, unionization, and the Vietnam War;3° criticism of
a Governor and a state legislature;31 articles by nonstudents containing
alleged obscenity;32 and "derogatory, profane, and blasphemous" attacks
on the Catholic Church. 33 Moreover, courts in the post-Tinker era have
held that broad categories of speech were protected and could not be
censored from student publications. These categories included features
on premarital sex and the problems of teenage sexuality, along with such
controversial topics as birth control and abortion.34 Also held protected
were articles about drug abuse, including advocacy of the reform of drug
laws; 35 criticisms of school policies or personnel;36 unsigned articles; 37
materials offensive to good taste38 or presenting a negative image of the
school; 39 and articles on such non-school-related topics as the draft or
the war in Vietnam. 4°
These decisions were the direct progeny of Tinker. After almost
twenty years, Tinker remained the dispositive statement on student free
speech rights. In Tinker, the Supreme Court stated that students "are
'persons' under our Constitution . . .possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect." 41 Tinker held that absent a showing of
26. Zucker, 299 F. Supp. at 103.
27. Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
28. Kom v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970).
29. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
30. Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
31. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot
sub nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
32. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
33. Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d 238, 239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335
(1973).
34. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972); Gambino v.
Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th
Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without op., 515 F.2d
504 (2d Cir. 1975).
35. Shanley, 462 F.2d at 972.
36. Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
rey'd, 452 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988, 989 (N.D. Ill.
1968), rev'd, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
37. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 349 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 601
(7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot per curiam, 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
38. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1977); Shanley, 462 F.2d at 960.
39. Shanley, 462 F.2d at 960; Scoville, 286 F. Supp. at 988.
40, Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Zucker v. Panitz, 299
F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
41. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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"material and substantial interference with school work or discipline"
schools could not restrain the first amendment rights of their students. 42
That holding flowed directly from the Supreme Court's decision in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 43 There, the Court stated
that "educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protec-
tion of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important princi-
ples of our government as mere platitudes." 44
The Supreme Court decided only one high-school free speech case
between Tinker and Kuhlmeier. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fra-
ser, 45 a seven-member majority of the Court upheld a public school dis-
trict's suspension of a student who used sexually suggestive puns in a
speech at a school-sponsored assembly. In a convoluted opinion written
by Chief Justice Burger and delivered on the day of his retirement, the
Court claimed to follow the Tinker standard by "tak[ing] into account
consideration of the sensibilities of others" in upholding the suspension.46
In view of other opinions dealing with student free expression,47 Fraser
was an anomaly. Kuhlmeier arose against this background and following
this long history of judicial protection of the student press.
II. KUHLMEIER-FACTS AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
A. Facts.
Spectrum is the student newspaper at the Hazelwood East High
School in St. Louis County, Missouri.4 During the spring semester of
1983, Kathy Kuhlmeier, Lee Ann Tippett, and Leslie Smart were mem-
bers of Spectrum's staff and were enrolled in Hazelwood's Journalism II
42. Id.
43. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44. Id. at 637.
45. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
46. Id. at 681.
47. See supra note 21.
48. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd, 795
F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). The school provided approximately three-
fourths of the funds required to publish Spectrum, and the remaining fourth was raised through sales
of the paper at 25; per copy. Id. at 1452. Hazelwood East High School is a public school in St.
Louis County, Missouri, run by the Hazelwood School District, with responsibility vested in a Board
of Education. Id at 1451. That Board governs the school's administrators, teachers, and approxi-
mately 1800 students. Id.
During the spring semester of 1983, Hazelwood East's High School principal and instructional
leader was Robert E. Reynolds. Id Spectrum was advised, prior to April 29, 1983, by Robert
Stergos. Id. at 1452. After May 1, 1983, another teacher, Howard Emerson, assumed responsibility
as faculty advisor until the end of the 1982-1983 academic year. See infra note 49.
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class.49 The primary activity of that class was to produce Spectrum. 50
The Journalism II students were supposed to apply skills that they had
acquired in previous classes and also learn to manage "leadership
responsibilities." 51
While primary responsibility for the newspaper's content rested
with the Journalism II students, other students could also submit articles
or letters to the editor for publication.52 Three years before the incident
in question, Spectrum had run an editorial entitled "The Right to
Write." This editorial stated:
Because Spectrum is a member of the press and especially because
Spectrum is the sole press of the student body, Spectrum has a respon-
sibility to that student body to be fair and unbiased in reporting, to
point out injustice and, thereby, guard student freedoms, and to up-
hold the high level of journalistic excellence. This may, at times, cause
Spectrum to be unpopular with some. Spectrum is not printed to be
popular. Spectrum is printed to inform, entertain, guide and serve the
student body-no more and, hopefully, no less.5 3
In furtherance of this policy, the students involved in publishing Spec-
trum at the beginning of the 1982-1983 school year published the follow-
ing statement: "All non-by-lined editorials appearing in this newspaper
reflect the opinions of the Spectrum staff, which are not necessarily
shared by the administrators or faculty of Hazelwood East."' 54 The state-
ment of policy also declared that "[o]nly speech that 'materially and sub-
stantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline' can
be found unacceptable and therefore prohibited. '55
The school board had also formulated several policies governing stu-
dent publications. Board Policy 348.5(a) stated, "[s]tudents are entitled
to express in writing their personal opinions."' 56 Board Policy 348.51 fur-
49. These facts are drawn largely from the findings in Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1450. The
authors were involved in the litigation as it evolved, and many of the facts also are drawn from
personal knowledge.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1452.
52. Id. at 1453.
53. Id. at 1455.
54. Id.
55. Id. The "Statement of Policy" quoted Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting in turn Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)). According to Mr. Stergos, Spectrum published this "Statement of Policy" at the beginning
of each academic year; however, the court received no documentary evidence on this point.
Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1455. Consistent with this policy statement, Spectrum, in the years prior
to the Kuhimeier litigation, covered topics that included teenage dating, the effect of television on
children, students' use of drugs and alcohol, race relations, teenage marriage, the death penalty, the
St. Louis schools desegregation case, runaways, teenage pregnancy, religious cults, the draft, school
busing, and students' fourth amendment rights. Id. at 1453.
56. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1455.
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ther provided that "[s]chool sponsored student publications will not re-
strict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible
journalism. '57
For their May 13, 1983, issue Spectrum's staff, with the approval
and aid of both its advisors, planned a six-page edition,58 including a
two-page spread dealing with articles of sensitivity and topicality to teen-
agers. 59 The topics of the articles were (1) a primarily statistical look at
teenage pregnancy, with a discussion of related topics including birth
control and abortion; (2) a discussion of the then-controversial "squeal
law" that would require federally funded clinics to notify parents when
teenagers sought birth control; (3) an account of three Hazelwood East
students who became pregnant, with their names changed to protect
their identities; (4) an article on the seventy-five-percent failure rate of
teenage marriages; (5) an article discussing teenage runaways and avail-
able sources of help for them; and (6) an article discussing juvenile delin-
quency and the procedures available to deal with delinquency
problems. 60
Hazelwood principal Robert Reynolds required that Spectrum's
faculty advisor submit each issue of the paper to him for approval prior
to publication. 61 The advisor thus left the Spectrum galley proofs for
Mr. Reynolds on May 10.62 On May 11, Mr. Reynolds reviewed the
proofs during a telephone conversation and directed the advisor to delete
the two-page spread from the May 13 issue.63 Spectrum staff members
learned of the deletion only after viewing final copies of the paper deliv-
ered to the school for distribution on the morning of May 13. 64 Upon
protesting to the principal, the students learned that the deleted articles
were "too sensitive" for "our immature audience of readers." 65 Mr.
Reynolds's concerns focused on the article that provided personal ac-
counts of three pregnant Hazelwood East students; he claimed that there
were only eight to ten students at Hazelwood East who were pregnant
that year, and thus the students discussed in the paper might be
identifiable. 66
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1459.
59. Id. at 1457-58.
60. Id. at 1457.
61. See id. at 1453-54.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1458-59.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1460.
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B. Judicial History.
In response to Mr. Reynolds's actions, Kuhlmeier, Tippett, and
Smart filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri, seeking declaratory relief, damages, and injunctive re-
lief67 for a violation of their constitutional rights. 68 The district court
ruled in favor of the school district, noting that while the Tinker decision
granted students first amendment rights that did not stop at the school-
house gate, their rights were not "coextensive with those of adults" 69 and
"[iln the high school setting, school officials and teachers must be ac-
corded a wide latitude over decisions affecting the manner in which they
educate students."' 70 The district court went on to distinguish between
what it perceived as two lines of cases-one line comprising situations
"where student speech or conduct occurred outside of official school pro-
grams," and the other line "where the speech or conduct in question
occurred within the context of school-sponsored programs. '71 The court
cited a total of ten cases72 and noted that, in the second line of cases,
when educators had attempted to prohibit student speech ii school-spon-
sored activities, the results had been mixed.73 Although the Supreme
Court subsequently overruled one of these cases,74 at the time of the dis-
trict court decision in Kuhlmeier, only two of the cited cases involved
censorship of a school-sponsored newspaper. 75 The district court, over-
67. Kuhlmeler, 578 F. Supp. at 1290. The court dismissed the claims for injunctive relief on the
ground that they had become moot when the plaintiffs graduated from Hazelwood High School.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 596 F. Supp. 1422, 1424 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
68. Kuhlmeler, 578 F. Supp. at 1289. The students sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1982),
which authorize lawsuits based on deprivations of constitutional rights. In this case the students
alleged violations of their first and fourteenth amendment rights. See Kuhlmeier, 578 F. Supp. at
1289.
69. Kuhlmeler, 607 F. Supp. at 1462 (quoting Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th
Cir. 1980)).
70. Id. (quoting Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982)).
71. Id.
72. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Nicholson, 682 F.2d at 858; Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Gambino v. Fairfax County
School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Stanton v. Brunswick School Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D.
Me. 1984); Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Frasca v.
Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd without op., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
73. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1463.
74. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986).
75. Nicholson, 682 F.2d at 858; Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1043. Two other cases are distinguish-
able. In Seyfried, the students' first amendment rights were not violated because the cancelled theat-
rical production was selected by faculty, not students. 668 F.2d at 217 n.2. In Trachtman, the
school prohibited a sexual survey seeking information, not the distribution of information already
obtained. 563 F.2d at 514-15.
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looking the fact that even in the so-called "second line" of cases, the
students had usually prevailed, found this second line applicable. The
court relied primarily on the decision of the Third Circuit in Seyfried v.
Walton, 76 which involved a high-school superintendent's decision to can-
cel a production of the musical Pippin, and found that "Spectrum was an
integral part of Hazelwood East's curriculum, as opposed to a public
forum for free expression by students. '77
The students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.78 While the court of appeals for the most part accepted
the district court's factual findings, it disagreed with the lower court's
conclusion that Spectrum was not a public forum. The Eighth Circuit
stated that "although Spectrum was produced by the Journalism II class,
it was a 'student publication' in every sense."' 79 The court found substan-
tial evidence that the students made the primary decisions about the pa-
per's content, noting that even the paper's past advisor testified that it
was the students' paper first and foremost, that the students made most
of the content decisions, and that he reserved his input for questions of
law or ethics.80 Also influencing the court was the breadth of subject
matter covered by the newspaper, the sale of over 4500 copies in the
1982-1983 school year, and the policy statement published on September
14, 1982.81
Having determined that Spectrum was a forum for public expres-
sion, the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's formulation that
school officials must demonstrate only a "reasonable basis" for the ac-
tions they take82 and adopted the Tinker standard that any ban must be
"necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school
work or discipline... or the rights of others. 83 Under that standard,
the Eighth Circuit analyzed the principal's justification for censorship-
his concern that the teenage pregnancy story threatened a violation of the
students' privacy.8 4 The court held that the school district's reasons did
not justify this censorship.8 5 As the Eighth Circuit read the Supreme
Court's statement in Tinker that suppression of expression would be jus-
76. 668 F.2d at 214.
77. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1465.
78. Kuhlmeler, 795 F.2d at 1368.
79. Id. at 1372.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1466.
83. Kuhlmeier, 595 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
84. Id. at 1375-76.
85. Id. at 1376.
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tifled to protect invasions of fights, schools had power to suppress only
speech that invaded fights defined under existing tort law standards.86
The court ruled that, because the girls involved had given their consent
to be quoted in the articles and because the articles did not identify the
fathers of the babies or expose any details about the lives of the girls'
parents, no invasion of privacy had occurred.8 7 Having made these rul-
ings, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of damages.88
Following the decision of the Eighth Circuit, the Hazelwood School
District petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court
granted certiorari89 and scheduled argument.
III. KUHLMEIER-THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court heard argument in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier on October 13, 1987, and rendered its decision three months
later.90 By a vote of five to three,91 the Court overruled the Eighth Cir-
cuit. Although the Court started with the proposition from Tinker that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate," 92 it rapidly added that "the First
Amendment rights of students in public schools 'are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.' -93
The Court then analyzed whether Spectrum was a forum for public
expression; it agreed with the district court that no forum existed because
the school had continued to exert control over the paper.94 Having de-
termined that Spectrum was not in fact a public forum, the Court went
on to question "whether the First Amendment requires a school affirma-
tively to promote particular student speech."' 95 In framing the question
this way, the Court implicitly disregarded Spectrum's statement of pol-
icy, its disclaimer that the paper's views did not represent those of the
school district, and the fact that Spectrum raised a significant portion of
86. Id. at 1375 (citing Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MIcH. L.
REv. 625, 640 (1984)).
87. Id. at 1376.
88. Id. at 1377.
89. 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987).
90. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 562.
91. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan filed a dissent, joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun. See id
92. Id. at 567 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
93. Id. (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
94. Id. at 567-68.
95. Id. at 569.
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its funding through sales. Instead, the Court focused on the school's pro-
vision of the funds not raised through sales and on the newspaper's pro-
duction by students in a for-credit situation, considering these facts as
evidence that the newspaper bore "the imprimatur of the school."'96
The Court found this issue relevant not only to Spectrum, but to all
"school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expres-
sive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 97 Thus, the
Court intended the Kuhimeier decision to apply to all activities that
might "fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether
or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowl-
edge or skills to student participants and audiences. 98 The Court also
stated that it considered a public high school the "publisher" of a school
newspaper and the "producer" of a school play and that, as such, the
school had the right to disassociate itself from speech that is "ungram-
matical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences." 99
In Kuhlmeier, the Court took an activist approach, deciding issues
not necessary to determine the case at bar. Until its argument before the
Supreme Court, the school district had raised only an invasion of privacy
issue.10 Ignoring this limitation, the Court structured an extremely
broad standard for permissible censorship, stating that "a school must be
able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience
in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sen-
sitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an
elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a
high-school setting."10 1 The Court went so far as to say that school offi-
cials could censor student expression that "might reasonably be per-
ceived to advocate ... conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared
values of a civilized social order.' "102 To assist school administrators in
the performance of this guardianship, the Court stated that administra-
tQ s' actions need only be "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."
103
96. Id.
97. Id
98. Id. at 570.
99. Id.
100. See Appellees' Brief and Argument at 13-14, Kuhlmeler, 795 F.2d at 1368 (No. 85-1614).
101. Kuhhmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570 (emphasis added).
102. Id. (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
103. Id. at 571.
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The Supreme Court did not grant schools universal authority over
publications, however. It implicitly left open the possibility that if facts
indicated that a school had, by policy or practice, created a school-spon-
sored publication that was a forum, the Tinker standard would still ap-
ply. 1°4 It expressly reserved the question of school authority over
publications that are not school-sponsored activities, 105 as well as the
question of administrative authority at the university or college level to
censor "school-sponsored expressive activities." 106
In dissent, Justice Brennan charged that the majority had essentially
upset the balance of-if not implicitly overruled-Tinker. 107 He re-
minded the Court that it had once stated that the "mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint" did not justify official suppression of student speech in the
high schools.108 To Justice Brennan, the Court's distinction between
school-sponsored publications and speech occurring in a nonsponsored
or independent fashion (lifted largely from the district court's decision)
was an artificial one that lacked prior support.109
Justice Brennan noted that the Court offered "an obscure tangle of
three excuses" to justify its decision: "the public educator's prerogative
to control curriculum; the pedagogical interest in shielding the high
school audience from objectionable viewpoints and sensitive topics; and
the school's need to disassociate itself from student expression." 110 The
dissent furiously criticized the second justification-the idea that a
school is responsible for shielding impressionable high-school audiences
from unsuitable material-by discussing a line of decisions that, in Jus-
tice Brennan's view, invalidated the presumed right of the school to act
as a member of the "thought police." ' He also pointed out that the
104. See Kuhlmeler, 108 S. Ct. at 567-68. One court has already misinterpreted Kuhlmeier in
this regard. In Planned Parenthood of Southern Nev., Inc. v. Clark County School Dist., No. 84-
765 RDF, slip op. (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 1988), appealpending, the district court ignored the "policy and
practice" language of Kuhimeler and said that school-sponsored publications are now incapable of
being public forums. Id., slip op. at 7 ("high school newspapers and other student publications are
not public fora").
105. 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.6.
106. Id. at 571 n.7.
107. Id. at 575 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 575 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 576.
11. Id. at 577 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). Justice Brennan noted that of the
"three excuses," the first concern is fully addressed by the Tinker decision, the second concern is
illegitimate, and the third is readily addressed by less oppressive means. Note, however, that even
Justice Brennan thought that a basis exists for an educator's right, under Tinker, to "censor" poor
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Court's third concern, the school's right to disassociate itself from
speech, could easily be handled by requiring the newspaper to publish a
disclaimer or by issuing a response to the newspaper, both significantly
less intrusive than the censorship powers granted by the Court.11 2
Justice Brennan's dissent concluded that there is no way to reconcile
the Kuhlmeier decision with the Tinker decision, and that Kuhlmeier at
least partially overrules the case from which it claims logically to de-
scend.113 We now consider the legacy of the Kuhlmeier decision.
IV. THE LEGACY OF KUHLMEIER
A. Redefining Public Forums in High Schools.
As parts II and III have noted, three different courts took exceed-
ingly different views on whether Spectrum qualified as a forum for public
expression. We believe that both the district court and the Supreme
Court decided this question incorrectly. Both courts erred as to school-
sponsored student newspapers in general and Spectrum in particular. In
fact, in ruling that Spectrum was a public forum, the Eighth Circuit re-
lied on the same factual findings made by the district court in its ruling
that Spectrum was not a public forum. 1 1 4
The record contained sufficient evidence to support the ruling that a
forum existed and that Spectrum, like other student publications, was
"conceived, established, and operated as a conduit for student expression
on a wide variety of topics. 11 5 Even the district court conceded that
"students not enrolled in Journalism II could submit material for publi-
cation" and that a column entitled "Letters to the Editor" was open to
students who were not enrolled in Journalism II and did not receive
credit for their submissions. 116 Also left unchallenged were Spectrum's
consistent coverage of issues of interest to the entire Hazelwood School
District community and its ability to raise approximately one-fourth of
its income through sales.' 17
Even the Hazelwood School District's own policies, which allowed
students freedom of written expression and prohibited school censor-
grammar, writing, or research because such items might materially disrupt a newspaper's curricular
purpose. Ia at 576.
112. Id. at 579 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602).
113. Id. at 580.
114. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1372.
115. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 735 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam,
564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); see also STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, LAW OF THE STUDENT
PRESS 14-15 (1985) (discussing forum theory in Gambino).
116. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1453.
117. Id. at 1452-53.
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ship,118 established that the school district intended Spectrum as a forum
for student expression. These policies reaffirmed the experience of stu-
dents who worked on the staff of the student newspaper at Hazelwood
East: Spectrum was by intention and in fact a student newspaper for the
presentation of student news, views, and opinions. 19
These facts should have been determinative. Few student newspa-
pers, official or unofficial, distributed for free or sold, provide the stimu-
lation for public debate present in Spectrum's articles. Of the three
courts that examined Spectrum's status, not even the Eighth Circuit, the
only court to rule in favor of the students, focused on the idea that the
determination whether or not a publication is a forum for public expres-
sion should be based upon how information is received and used as well
as how it is produced.120
The Supreme Court, in its rush to find an expansive rationale for
handing schools more control, neglected to properly analyze the forum
issue. Rather than discussing the fact that cities and states create parks,
public squares, and courthouse steps, rarely expecting them to be used as
forums for public expression, the Supreme Court fell back on its state-
ment in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion 121 that "school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if
school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities
'for indiscriminate use by the general public.' "122
118. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
119. Spectrum's situation at Hazelwood East compares to that of other student publications
recognized, before Kuhlmeier, as protected by the first amendment. In Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F.
Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court prevented censorship of a student newspaper that school offi-
cials described as a curricular device "intended to inure primarily to the benefit of those who com-
pile, edit and publish it." Id. at 103. The court indicated that such a claim was without merit and
noted that the newspaper was sold to the student body, included letters to the editor, and ran stories
on controversial topics: "It is clear that the newspaper is more than a mere activity time and place
sheet." Id.; see also Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 572, 574-75 (5th Cir.) (literary magazine
produced with advice of college English department and connected to course for credit found to be
public forum), aff'd as modified en banc per curiam, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1974); Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 735 (high-school newspaper with some staff members
enrolled in journalism class and receiving academic credit for work on newspaper found to be a
public forum); Stanton v. Brunswick School Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560, 1570-71 (D. Me. 1984) (high-
school yearbook that allowed students to include short quote next to photograph was de facto public
forum for purposes of granting preliminary injunction).
In a factual situation difficult to distinguish from Kuhimeier, the court in Reineke v. Cobb
County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980), held that a preliminary injunction against
censorship was appropriate, because a substantial likelihood existed that the trial court would hold
the official high-school newspaper protected from censorship. In Reineke, the student editors and
staff received academic credit for enrollment in a journalism class whose teacher was the newspa-
per's advisor as well. See id. at 1255.
120. See Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1373-74.
121. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
122. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 568 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
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In Perry, the Supreme Court established three categories of forums
under the public forum doctrine: (1) the quintessential public forum,
(2) the limited public forum, and (3) the nonpublic forum. 123 In this
scheme, a school-sponsored student newspaper like Spectrum is a limited
public forum. A student newspaper is concededly not a quintessential
public forum like a street or a park. But, as the Supreme Court noted in
Perry, a "public forum" may be created for a limited purpose such as use
by certain groups. 24 The school district made Spectrum a forum open
for general use by a limited group-students. 25 In stark contrast to
Perry, in which the school district had a written contract limiting the
distribution of materials through faculty mailboxes, the Hazelwood
School District's policies encouraged written student expression. 26 The
facts, as found by the district court and accepted by both the Eighth
Circuit and the Supreme Court, showed that the school established the
student newspaper for use by a limited public of student staff members as
a place for their expressive activity.
By misapplying Perry to what was in fact a public forum, the
Supreme Court provided schools with an easy mechanism for determin-
ing whether or not their student newspaper is a forum for public expres-
sion. 127 Most schools will interpret the decision as giving them the
authority to control a student newspaper unless they designate it a public
forum. However, schools that censor will not do their students or their
educational goals a service.
B. The Social Impact of the Kuhlmeier Decision.
As noted above, 128 the Supreme Court has drawn a box around
school-sponsored publications, stating that they are not forums for public
expression unless policy or practice gives clear evidence of such a
designation. Many schools will censor as a result of this decision. We
now examine the plight of students at those schools.
123. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
124. Id. at 46 n.7.
125. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 n.5 (1981).
126. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
127. The public forum doctrine is not the only method for defining and protecting student free
press rights. However, a Supreme Court that approved so restrictive a stance was not likely to
search for other rationales to justify students' free speech. In protecting student journalists, many
lower courts have relied on a pure free press analysis similar to that enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See Stanley v. McGrath, 719 F.2d
279, 282 (8th Cir. 1983); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp. 143, 146-48 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd,
829 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987); Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-57
(N.D. Ga. 1980); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without op.,
515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
128. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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For students who want to work on the staff of a school newspaper,
the Kuhlmeier decision puts them to a Hobson's Choice between staying
with the school-sponsored publication or working for (or founding) a
non-official, "underground" publication. A student who stays with the
official publication will continue, in many cases, to receive credit for her
participation. That is a value not to be underestimated in the crowded
life of a teenager; demands on a teenager's time force difficult decisions.
Moreover, the serious student who wants to be a journalist, or merely
wants to learn to write better, will recognize the clear advantage in hav-
ing access to a journalism advisor, particularly if that advisor has formal
experience or training in writing and journalism. For students such as
these, the benefit of having a professional overseeing the development of
their writing and reporting skills is incalculable. In the wake of the
Kuhlmeier decision, the student who maintains ties with the student pub-
lication in order to gain these advantages will merely have to sacrifice her
editorial freedom.
Conversely, a student can join an underground publication, if one
exists, or otherwise seek to form one. The clear advantage of working on
such a publication after the Kuhlmeier decision is its editorial freedom.
The publication will not be part of the school's curriculum or funded by
the school. Therefore, school control will be limited to the administra-
tors' ability to intercept the publication before its dissemination to stu-
dents on school grounds. As we discuss below, 129 school administrators
will be limited even in their ability to do this. However, the student who
chooses to go underground will have to sacrifice credit and educational
input. Students' sole "educators" in an underground newspaper will be
other students who are at most a year or two older. Students participat-
ing in such publications will trade educational benefits for the right to
experience journalistic first amendment freedoms "at their apogee."1 30
In forcing student journalists to make this choice, the Supreme
Court has sent a message not only to student journalists, but also to all
public school students. It has told them in the past that the educational
system exists to inculcate in tomorrow's leaders the "fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system." 131 It has
also stated that public education serves to prepare the youth of our na-
tion to deal with "our increasingly complex society and ... the duties of
citizenship in our democratic Republic." 132 The Court is now telling stu-
129. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
130. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1463.
131. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
132. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
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dents, however, that they must receive these values passively, without an
opportunity to debate on a schoolwide basis the issues and concerns of
the day. It blithely presumes that other equally efficient mechanisms,
such as the local news media, will enable students in a public high school
to receive the information they need to make their own choices about
such issues and concerns.
This presumption is naive. Small-town newspapers frequently shy
away from discussing controversial issues relating to the children in their
readership. Equally specious is the idea that, in a major metropolitan
area, a newspaper will devote sufficient space to the unique concerns of
the teenage population, which does not, after all, buy microwaves, sheets,
expensive automobiles, or even many copies of the newspaper.
As a result, the major source of information for teenagers will be
other teenagers, from whom there is no guarantee that the information
provided is correct. With a student newspaper, properly supervised by a
member of a high-school faculty cognizant of student journalists' right to
free speech, there was both discussion of sensitive issues and a general
assurance of accuracy. The Supreme Court has disrupted this balance,
forcing a choice between discussion and accuracy. Moreover, the Court
has sent a message to the students of America that constitutional guaran-
tees do, indeed, largely stop at the schoolhouse gate. 133 Students are
taught that they must pay homage to the values of the Constitution even
though they will have no enforceable constitutional rights until they re-
ceive their high-school diploma.
The likely effect of such a message is student cynicism. Students
who might have eagerly awaited a chance to participate in our system as
adults may instead pursue more parochial concerns. Students who might
have considered careers in journalism will turn instead to other interests.
These cannot be the messages that the Supreme Court intended to send
the youth of America.
C. The Legal Aftermath of the Kublmeier Decision.
1. Demise of the Disruption Standard. Prior to the Kuhlmeier de-
cision, the Supreme Court and the lower courts had held that student
local governments .... It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities
.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.").
133. Cf. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (student does not have a
first amendment right to utter lewd and indecent speech at high-school assembly); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (search of student by school official or teacher does not violate
the student's fourth amendment rights and is "'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated... the law
or the rules of the school.").
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expression could be censored only if it caused "substantial disrup-
tion." 134 The Supreme Court in Kuhlmeier, however, has developed a
new standard for school-sponsored publications; the standard no longer
requires substantial disruption, but rather allows editorial control over
student speech so long as the control is "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."' 135
In creating this new standard, the Supreme Court has, without suffi-
cient justification, disemboweled the disruption standard for school-spon-
sored publications. From 1969 to 1988, in only one case were school
officials able to convince a court that a material and substantial disrup-
tion of a high school would in fact have occurred had certain material
been published in a school-sponsored student publication.' 36 In that
case, the court held that an editorial reference in the student newspaper
to "hot-headed, egotistical, 'pissed-off' jocks" could have resulted in a
physical disruption. The court based its decision on the unsupported
opinion of three school officials: the building principal who was the cen-
sor, the coach of the athletes referred to, and an English teacher who was
the newspaper's faculty advisor. 37
Nor did the Supreme Court in Kuhlmeier need to alter the disrup-
tion standard. There was no evidence that the Spectrum articles would
have disrupted classes. There was also no reasonable forecast of an un-
warranted invasion of privacy as a result of the stories. 138 As the Eighth
Circuit noted, Spectrum staffers obtained the consent of all those inter-
viewed.' 39 Significantly, none of the interviewed students complained
about the stories, which were subsequently published in their entirety in
134. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); see also
Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 (5th Cir. 1972); Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,
749 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966);
Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 749 (E.D. Va. 1977); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp.
592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973), vacated and remanded, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973); Sullivan v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
135. Kuhimeler, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
136. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). In another case, Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held, over a persuasive dissent, that the distribution of a student
survey on sexual practices met the Tinker standard for censorship. The case, however, did not
involve material that a student newspaper was seeking to publish.
137. Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1051.
138. As the court of appeals noted, it is specious to define Tinker's "invasion of the rights of
others" standard to allow censorship of material that is not materially and substantially disruptive or
a tortious invasion of privacy. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1376.
139. Id. A minor's consent is effective if he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and
probable consequences of the conduct to which he consents, even if parental consent is not obtained
or expressly refused. RE ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1982). Although the school
district presented witnesses at trial who claimed they could identify the students interviewed for the
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a regional newspaper.140 The Hazelwood School District was motivated
by discomfort about the discussion of teenage pregnancy and divorce, not
by fear of disruption or concerns with invading privacy. A blanket pro-
hibition of such controversial topics threatens "a value at the very core of
the First Amendment." 141
Kuhlmeier involved viewpoint suppression, not fear of substantial
disruption. It was the "sexual norm" of the three pregnant students, as
the school district described it,142 that provided the basis for the school's
decision to censor. Thus, notwithstanding that in twenty years only one
court had found a need to uphold the censorship of an official school-
sponsored publication under the higher substantial disruption stan-
dard143 and that the Kuhlmeier record contained no evidence of interfer-
ence with education as a result of the articles, the Supreme Court in
Kuhimeier needlessly changed the standard to allow for wide-ranging
control of student speech by school administrators.
Were a concern that education was suffering under the Tinker stan-
dard well-founded, common sense would indicate that high schools not
imposing prior restraints would be in chaos. In Fujishima v. Board of
Education, 144 the Seventh Circuit held unconstitutional a school regula-
tion requiring prior approval and allowing restraint of student publica-
tions distributed on school grounds. Yet in the years since Fujishima,
there has been no suggestion that high-school education in Illinois, Wis-
consin, or Indiana has suffered because of the limitations on prior re-
straints. The Seventh Circuit considered sufficient the schools' authority
to subsequently punish students for activity that creates a material dis-
ruption. 145 Moreover, the court left school officials the option to seek
injunctive relief when they anticipate that a situation warrants the ex-
treme and immediate action of prior restraint. Yet no indication exists
that even once in sixteen years has a school official in any of the'three
states sought prior restraint through an injunction.
In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court took an approach almost diamet-
rically opposed to the Seventh Circuit's approach in Fujishima. While
pregnancy story, it presented no evidence that any of the students portrayed in the story lacked
capacity to understand the effect of their consent.
140. Too Hot for Hazelwood, St. Louis Globe Democrat, Dec. 9, 1985, Weekend Section, at 5.
141. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 548 n.9 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
142. See Brief for Petitioners at 34-36, Kuhlmeler, 108 S. Ct. at 562 (No. 86-836). Interestingly,
petitioner's amicus, Pacific Legal Foundation, had no hesitation in noting the viewpoints suppressed.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at 15-17, Kuhlmeier (No.
86-836).
143. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
144. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
145. See id. at 1359.
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the Kuhlmeier approach will prevent school-sponsored publications from
interfering with the educational process, in light of past judicial decisions
and experience, the Court is using an atom bomb to swat a fly.
2. The Creation of a Two-Tiered Student Press--School-Sponsored
and Non-School-Sponsored Publications. Not every paper that schools
might perceive as school-sponsored comes within the ambit of the
Kuhlmeier decision. Those publications that in practice have been fo-
rums for student expression will be unaffected. In addition, it is unclear
what level of support or institutional involvement Kuhlmeier requires
before a publication comes "to bear the imprimatur of the school." 146 As
a legal matter, what does "school-sponsored" mean? Does an after-
hours newspaper club produce a school-sponsored paper, simply because
a teacher supervises it or because it receives some school funds that inci-
dentally help to produce the newspaper?
Schools might attempt to avoid these questions suggested by the
Kuhlmeier decision by designating all student publications nonforums.
To do this, schools might try to change currently independent newspa-
pers, now labeled forums, or newspapers produced by clubs, into newspa-
pers labeled nonforums and produced within a class for credit under the
supervision of a faculty member. Although the Kuhlmeier decision
greatly expands schools' powers, it is unclear whether a school could suc-
cessfully convert a newspaper from a forum into an official, nonforum
publication.
Attempting to change the status of a newspaper solely to gain con-
trol over its content is analogous to other actions that high-school princi-
pals and college presidents have taken in the past to control the content
of student publications indirectly. Courts have swiftly and uniformly re-
jected schools' attempts to gain control over the content of a newspaper
by withdrawing financial support, 147 or by dismissing or suspending its
editors.148 In light of these decisions, attempts to convert a publication
from forum to nonforum for the stated or intended purpose of gaining
editorial control over the publication would likewise be found
unconstitutional.
146. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
147. See, eg., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Reineke v. Cobb County School
Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass.
1970).
148. See, eg., Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975);
Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971);
Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacatedas mootsub nor.
Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
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3. The Liability Factor. Even if school administrators convince
courts to allow them to bring student publications under school control,
there is a good reason why public institutions would not want such con-
trol: those who dictate the content of a publication will have financial
responsibility for any tortious material that appears in it. 149 Absent such
a control relationship, no financial responsibility for the content of stu-
dent publications exists.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized, in a slightly differ-
ent context, that officials who merely follow the dictates of the first
amendment are not financially liable for the torts of others. In Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 150 the Court held that
broadcasting stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion are barred from removing defamatory statements contained in
speeches by candidates for public office. If such censorship were permis-
sible, the Court said, "a station so inclined could intentionally inhibit a
candidate's legitimate presentation under the guise of lawful censorship
of libelous matter."' 15 Having recognized the legal inability to censor,
however, the Court stated that a licensee who broadcast a candidate's
defamatory statements would enjoy immunity from liability. Withhold-
ing immunity would allow the "unconscionable result" of permitting lia-
bility for the very conduct that the law demands.'52 "Quite possibly, if a
station were held responsible for the broadcast of libelous material [of
political candidates], all remarks even faintly objectionable would be ex-
cluded out of an excess of caution." 153
At least two courts have applied this rationale to student newspa-
pers at public institutions of higher education. In these cases, when the
crucial control element was missing, that is, when a public school fol-
lowed the established first amendment constraints and did not control
the content of the student newspaper, the school was immune from liabil-
ity. 154 Thus, an educational institution that refrains from censorship
protects itself from financial liability for torts that it should be in no posi-
tion, constitutionally or educationally, to prevent. Thus, after
Kuhlmeier, to convert a student newspaper providing a forum for stu-
149. Three factors determine whether or not such a control or agency relationship exists:
(1) consent, (2) benefit, and (3) right of control. See RE-TATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1
(1958).
150. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
151. Id. at 530.
152. Id. at 531.
153. Id. at 530.
154. Milliner v. Turner, 436 So. 2d 1300 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 442 So. 2d 453 (La. 1983);
Mazart v. State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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dent expression into a nonforum publication could be a serious financial
mistake.
4. Questions Remaining After Kuhlmeier. Although Kuhimeier
appears to be a tsunami that has wiped out all that existed before, upon
closer inspection, protections remain for student journalists' exercise of
free speech. For example, the Supreme Court, in footnote 7 of
Kuhlmeier, explicitly reserved the question whether a student publication
at the college or university level has protection from the wide-ranging
powers granted to secondary-school administrators in Kuhlmeier. 155
Although many university administrators may attempt to use Kuhlmeier
as a green light for censorship in higher education, the courts will likely
use Kuhlmeier's footnote 7 to limit the case's impact to the high-school
level. The courts' reasons will include the older age of college newspaper
reporters, the concomitantly higher age of these newspapers' readers, the
increased independence generally granted to students in higher educa-
tion, and the acknowledgement that such students are, in fact, young
adults with full legal rights in our system (save, in most states, the right
to drink).
Likewise, Kuhlmeier is limited by its own terms to secondary-
school-sponsored publications that are not public forums for student ex-
pression. Therefore, the case should be read to exclude from administra-
tive control any newspaper that is "underground" or independent. 156
In the post-Kuhlmeier world, publications at institutions of higher
education and independent (or forum) publications in secondary schools
retain, for the time being, extensive first amendment protections. College
and university publications still may not be censored, and the voices of
independent secondary-school publications can only be restricted when
schools afford due process.157
For these publications, the first amendment requires that speech re-
155. Kuhimeier 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.7 ("We need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level,").
156. Supporting the idea that underground newspapers are not included in the ambit of the
Kuhineier decision is the Supreme Court's statement that the distinctions drawn in permitting cur-
riculum control are fully consistent with the decision involving a university-level underground in
Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570 n.3. Equally persua-
sive is the Court's suggestion that "[w]e need not now decide whether such [specific written] regula-
tions are required before school officials may censor publications not sponsored by the school that
students seek to distribute on school grounds." Id. at 571 n.6. Thus, the Supreme Court has pre-
sumptively left valid the decisions in Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973);
Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of
Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); and other cases involving underground publications..
157. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975); Gambino v. Fairfax County
School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
(Vol. 1988:706
Vol. 1988:706] KUHLMEIER 729
strictions be "narrowly drawn."1 58 For such regulations to escape a
void-for-vagueness determination, they must be enumerated with "suffi-
cient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement." 15 9
Prior restraints, if they are to exist at all,160 must meet certain mini-
mal requirements. The regulations must offer criteria and specific exam-
ples so that students will understand what expression is proscribed. 161
They must detail the criteria by which an administrator might reason-
ably predict "substantial disruption."' 162 The regulations must provide
definitions of all key terms used,163 such as "defamatory." Students must
be given an opportunity to know that such rules exist; the regulations
must be included in an official school publication or circulated to stu-
dents in the same manner as other official material.164 These publication
guidelines also must specify who approves material 65 and must give the
students the right to a prompt hearing before the decisionmaker and the
opportunity to argue in favor of distribution. 166 Procedural due process
also requires that publication guidelines limit the official's time to reach a
decision to prevent distribution, 67 provide for the contingency of an ad-
ministrator failing to issue a decision within that time, 68 and include an
expeditious procedure for appealing that decision.169 These requirements
158. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978).
159. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). The Supreme Court's formulation allowing
only censorship that is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," Kuhlmeier, 108 S.
Ct. at 571, would have been held void for vagueness if expounded by a school board as part of a
regulation.
160. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), still prohibits prior review of
independent publications within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit.
161. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383; Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1349 (4th Cir. 1973);
Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1972).
162. Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383.
163. See Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965, 971 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (defining
"distribution"); Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383 (defining "libelous"); Shanley, 462 F.2d at 977 (defining
"distribution").
164. See Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383 n.4 ("We believe that a more effective notice would be at-
tained through inclusion in official publications of the school or circulated to students in the same
manner as other official materials ....").
165. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 811 (2d Cir. 1971).
166. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 749 (E.D. Va. 1977).
167. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast
Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner 440 F.2d at 810; Leibner, 429 F.
Supp. at 749.
168. See Baughman, 478 F.2d at 1348.
169. See Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965, 969 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Baugh-
man, 478 F.2d at 1349; Shanley, 462 F.2d at 977-78; Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59-60 (4th
Cir. 1971); Leibner, 429 F. Supp. at 749.
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survive Kuhlmeier and guarantee vitality for the independent student
press at the high-school level.
Nevertheless, in the wake of Kuhlmeier the outlook for the student
press is not all rosy. The decision has overruled a significant amount of
precedent from the last twenty years. It would be hard to argue that
decisions stating that high-school administrators lack the power to con-
trol the content of a school-sponsored newspaper prior to publication
have the same vitality.1 70 Although these cases will no longer apply to
publications found to be nonforums, other cases providing considerable
protection for the student press, including those relating to non-school-
sponsored and forum publications, still retain their vitality. Thus, in Illi-
nois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, Fufishima v. Board of Education 171 contin-
ues to render facially unconstitutional, and thus unenforceable, public
high schools' prepublication administrative review of non-school-spon-
sored publications.
5. State-Law Approaches. Finally, even though Kuhlmeier has
weakened much of the federal law of the last twenty years in the school
newspaper field, a layer of state regulation and caselaw in many jurisdic-
tions retains and expands protections of the student press, including
school-sponsored publications. For example, California and Massachu-
setts protect the rights of the student press by statute.1 72 This protection,
which prevents school administrators from interfering with the exercise
170. See Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Gambino v.
Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th
Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without op., 515 F.2d
504 (2d Cir. 1975); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456,459 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Zucker v. Panitz, 299
F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
171. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
172. The California Education Code states:
Students of the public schools shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of
the press including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed
materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia, and the right of
expression in official publications, whether or not such publications or other means of ex-
pression are supported financially by the school or by use of school facilities, except that
expression shall be prohibited which is obscene, libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited
shall be material which so incites students as to create a clear and present danger of the
commission of unlawful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school regula-
tions, or the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school..
Student editors of official school publications shall be responsible for assigning and
editing the news, editorial, and feature content of their publications subject to the limita-
tions of the section. However, it shall be the responsibility of a journalism advisor or
advisors of student publications within each school to supervise the production of the stu-
dent staff, to maintain professional standards of English and journalism, and to maintain
the provisions of this section.
There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school publications
except insofar as it violates this section. School officials shall have the burden of showing
justification without undue delay prior to any limitation of student expression under this
section.
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of a free press by secondary students, continues to remain in effect after
Kuhlmeier.
Likewise, various state supreme court decisions indicating that state
constitutions can and do grant more expansive free speech rights than
those ensured by the federal Constitution also remain in effect. Although
these cases have not specifically dealt with the student press, they have
been influenced by forum theory in that they view state constitutions as
broadening the circumstances and places in which people may speak, as
well as what they may say.173
Statutes such as those passed in California and Massachusetts, and
recent cases in such states as Pennsylvania, Washington, New Jersey, and
California, will offer the best hope for the expansion of student press
rights in the years ahead. While the expansion of rights by judicial deci-
sions is often difficult, persons seeking to expand the rights of the offi-
cially sponsored student press may approach their local school boards,
state boards of education, or legislatures for aid in enacting policies or
statutes similar to those in California and Massachusetts. Such legisla-
tive enactments would go a long way toward ameliorating the problems
"Official school publications" refers to material produced by students in the journal-
ism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing classes and distributed to the student body either free
or for a fee.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit or prevent any governing board of a school
district from adopting otherwise valid rules and regulations relating to oral communication
by students upon the premises of each school.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48,907 (West Supp. 1988).
The Massachusetts law states:
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth
shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder
within the school. Freedom of expression shall include without limitation, the rights and
responsibilities of students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through
speech and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to assemble
peaceably on school property for the purp6se of expressing their opinions....
No expression made by students in the exercise of such rights shall be deemed to be an
expression of school policy and no school officials shall be held responsible in any civil or
criminal action for any expression made or published by the students.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 82 (West 1978). This statute was initially elective for school
districts in Massachusetts. See id. § 86. On July 14, 1988, in response to the Kuhimeler decision,
the Massachusetts legislature made the provision mandatory. See 1988 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch.
137 (Law. Co-op.). For a history of the Massachusetts response to Kuhlmeier, see Phillips, Legisla-
tive Committee Backs Bill to Bar Censoring of School Papers, Boston Globe, Mar. 25, 1988, at 21, col.
1.
173. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (group protesting presence
of FBI director allowed on private college campus); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Coun-
cil, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (environmentalists permitted to solicit signatures in pri-
vately owned shopping center); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (state constitution
protects right of nonstudent political party members to distribute literature on private university
campus), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d
899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979) (opponent of "Zionism" allowed to solicit signatures
for petition at privately owned shopping center), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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created by Kuhlmeier and the resulting loss of free speech in the pluralis-
tic society of the American high school.
CONCLUSION
The majority of newspapers in America are student newspapers.1 74
The majority of journalists in America are student journalists.1 75 Stu-
dents participate in journalism for the education, the experience, the op-
portunity to improve their skills, and the lessons they can learn from the
individual stories that they cover and the overall process of newspaper
production. Those lessons are best learned in an environment as free as
possible from censorship. The Kuhlmeier decision is unquestionably a
serious step backward. However, it does not end the debate. As we have
argued, many student publications remain unaffected by Kuhlmeier and
many more can be protected through state and local mechanisms. Keep-
ing this in mind, there is no reason to believe that student journalism will
not remain a valid and vital force in the years ahead, so long as its con-
tributors continue to stand up for what they believe and speak out on the
great issues that affect their and their readers' lives.
174. In 1986, the total number of nonstudent newspapers in this country was 1657. EDITOR
AND PUBLISHER INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK 1987, memo from the publisher. Even assuming that
only half of the nation's 31,809 public and private secondary schools have student newspapers, such
newspapers far outnumber their nonstudent counterparts. See T. SNYDER, DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 1987, at 70 tbl. 59 (1983-1984 figures).
175. Of the 2,787,000 high-school seniors in 1982, 18%, or over 500,000, worked on the staff ofa
student publication. T. SNYDER, supra note 174, at 37 tbl. 29, 98 tbl. 85. The full-time work force in
news and editorial positions for the entire nonstudent print media has been estimated at only 75,876.
D. WEAVER & G. WILHOIT, THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST: A PORTRAIT OF U.S. NEWS PEOPLE
AND THEIR WORK 13 tbl. 2.1 (1986).
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